(written four and one half years ago)
Change management through honesty
America has communicated its interests in Iraq. Now it needs to exercise transparent efficiency in managing those interests. Quality management of the situation will require the same measures as any complex undertaking - to plan from the desired outcome and changing situation for the required resources, timelines and standards.
America has communicated its interests in Iraq. Now it needs to exercise transparent efficiency in managing those interests. Quality management of the situation will require the same measures as any complex undertaking - to plan from the desired outcome and changing situation for the required resources, timelines and standards.
Assumptions
America’s goal in Iraq is to provide a stable, expandable platform upon which a secure, and free nation can evolve, while serving as a latent agent of change for the Arab world.
Identify the path
Our plan for Iraq must be broken down into a critical path format that is linked to our existing National Security Strategy.
Our plan for Iraq must be broken down into a critical path format that is linked to our existing National Security Strategy.
Democracy by fiat
In the critical near term, Iraq’s disjointed cultural landscape will frustrate efforts to ratify a sustainable version of its constitution. In the long term, there will be real barriers to the fair administration of property rights, to fair access of representative government, and to justice.
Ironically, an unqualified democracy in Iraq raises the prospect of tyranny by majority, and an eventual balkanization of the republic.
Any secure, sustainable government in Iraq must be tempered with true economic and political equity, which may foster commerce and cooperation across cultural boundaries.
Status quo
The Bush administration maintains that the Iraqi interim government must now be allowed to provide its own destiny, with the Coalition standing ready to augment and assist as appropriate. A more definitive analysis of the situation, along with an appropriate set of program improvements/controls would provide a more realistic and accountable format for success.
Ironically, an unqualified democracy in Iraq raises the prospect of tyranny by majority, and an eventual balkanization of the republic.
Any secure, sustainable government in Iraq must be tempered with true economic and political equity, which may foster commerce and cooperation across cultural boundaries.
Status quo
The Bush administration maintains that the Iraqi interim government must now be allowed to provide its own destiny, with the Coalition standing ready to augment and assist as appropriate. A more definitive analysis of the situation, along with an appropriate set of program improvements/controls would provide a more realistic and accountable format for success.
Critical elements
Security, and political/economic equity are inextricably linked. Both elements are essential to the Coalition’s goals in the region, and both must be carefully developed and managed in tandem
Security, and political/economic equity are inextricably linked. Both elements are essential to the Coalition’s goals in the region, and both must be carefully developed and managed in tandem
Path to security
Strength in numbers
Sufficient numbers and types of Coalition personnel must be deployed to the region. Currently there is a dearth of Coalition forces deployed throughout the Iraqi countryside.
Communications/coordination
Communications management is needed for optimal cooperation of Coalition entities across military and non-military nodes. The current blend of ad-hoc communication networks needs to be inter-linked with a comprehensive, distributed, and flexible communications architecture.
The challenges of providing an appropriate level of inter-operability across such a diverse and informal network must be overcome with a distributed, scalable architecture. Currently, our military community has invested huge sums in various ad hoc communications platforms which are largely compartmentalized, rigid, and ultimately inefficient in a netcentric operations environment.
ABC’s of resource sharing
A unified plan requires an accounting scheme that promotes the fluid distribution and sharing of resources. Coalition efforts are hampered by legacy accounting practices.
Accounting methods that focus on cost centers, which are manipulated on archaic, flat-file data systems lead to replication of effort and hording. Coalition partners must embrace the spirit of interoperability and cooperation as encouraged by the 911 Comission's report.
The situation demands Activity Based Accounting concepts and tools.
Communications management is needed for optimal cooperation of Coalition entities across military and non-military nodes. The current blend of ad-hoc communication networks needs to be inter-linked with a comprehensive, distributed, and flexible communications architecture.
The challenges of providing an appropriate level of inter-operability across such a diverse and informal network must be overcome with a distributed, scalable architecture. Currently, our military community has invested huge sums in various ad hoc communications platforms which are largely compartmentalized, rigid, and ultimately inefficient in a netcentric operations environment.
ABC’s of resource sharing
A unified plan requires an accounting scheme that promotes the fluid distribution and sharing of resources. Coalition efforts are hampered by legacy accounting practices.
Accounting methods that focus on cost centers, which are manipulated on archaic, flat-file data systems lead to replication of effort and hording. Coalition partners must embrace the spirit of interoperability and cooperation as encouraged by the 911 Comission's report.
The situation demands Activity Based Accounting concepts and tools.
Cavorting with the former enemy
A more serious development of Iraq’s security infrastructure is needed. A lack of standards and protocol amongst Iraqi security elements limits the effectiveness of such units. Recruitment protocols, jurisdictions, and discipline must be controlled.
More fluid and effective information management regarding the recruitment of prospective personnel is crucial. There have already been several embarrassing accounts of recently inducted Iraqi officials who should never have passed the bar of pre-screening.
Improvement is also needed in the way Iraqi security forces are engaged. A gaggle of poorly trained personnel at a roadside checkpoint does little to dissuade armed attacks, and invites apathy from an already cynical public.
More efficient, effective coordination of Coalition and Iraqi resources will help, but will not suffice. Iraq’s security system needs to make tangible progress, to include enforcing its porous borders, documentation of its citizenry, and the implementation of selected curfews and search programs.
Achieving political/economic equity
Tribal realities
The quest to achieve equity in Iraqi government any time soon is ambitious at best, but it must work around the very regional-tribal dissonance that has yet prohibited the region from amalgamating of its own accord.
The quest to achieve equity in Iraqi government any time soon is ambitious at best, but it must work around the very regional-tribal dissonance that has yet prohibited the region from amalgamating of its own accord.
Accountability
The Coalition should hold Iraq’s officials accountable for the quality of emerging systems, to include: privatization of certain portions of its infrastructure; processes of property ownership; equity law and arbitration schemes; federal, provincial, and local-governmental tax schemes; federal, provincial, and local-governmental business licensing and regulatory schemes.
Political realism
Wisely, the coalition does not expect an egalitarian society to soon emerge from the cauldron of Iraq. Cultural parameters will continue to shape de-facto policy at the highest and local levels. The mission to shape an environment that can nurture bonds across cultural/tribal barriers also represents the Coalition’s best interests in the region and the world.
Ultimate change agent
We cannot create a secure, and self-sustaining multi-cultural state by fiat. We can possibly allow one to evolve by seeding and safeguarding the only forces that can possibly make it happen: the fair and open exchange of goods, services and ideas.
We cannot create a secure, and self-sustaining multi-cultural state by fiat. We can possibly allow one to evolve by seeding and safeguarding the only forces that can possibly make it happen: the fair and open exchange of goods, services and ideas.
